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HOW FAR CAN WE SEPARATE THEOLOGY
AND JURISPRUDENCE? COMMENT ON
EDWARD B. FOLEY'S
JURISPRUDENCE AND THEOLOGY
John Langan, S.J.*

P

ROFESSOR Foley's paper, "Jurisprudence and Theology," is definite in its conclusion, which is to propose a further wall of separation between the two realms it surveys, or at least between judges and
lawyers and what Foley assumes are their disparate and often contradictory views on the ultimate questions of life and on the ultimate
grounds of normative justification. His paper does not evade difficult
considerations; and it has a vigorous and forthright character, which is
both attractive in itself and morally commendable in its candor before
an audience large elements of which will be keen to dispute his conclusion. He deals with issues which have been shaped to a large extent by the recent work of John Rawls,' but which have also been
treated from a very different perspective by Vatican Council I. Professor Foley might, if he were so inclined, find some magisterial support for his conclusion in the following passage from Gaudium et Spes,
the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modem World:
If by the autonomy of earthly affairs we mean that created things
and societies themselves enjoy their own laws and values which
must be gradually deciphered, put to use, and regulated by men
(sic), then it is entirely right to demand that autonomy.
This is not merely required by modem man, but harmonizes also
with the will of the [Cireator. For by the very circumstance of their
having been created, all things are endowed
with their own stability,
2
truth, goodness, proper laws and order.
Admittedly, the Council is not explicitly addressing the scope and
sources of law; but its general approach is to present the Church as
collaborator with "the world" and with the activities of the academic
disciplines and the learned professions, rather than as their director or
supervisor. I mention this passage, not because I think it summarizes
all the important tendencies within the Catholic community on the
boundary which Professor Foley is proposing to draw, but because it
gives an especially authoritative statement of one tendency, a tendency which has been historically very important in Catholic thought,
* Rose Kennedy Professor of Christian Ethics, Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Ge-

orgetown University, and Henry Wirtenberger Professor of Social Ethics, Loyola University Chicago.

1. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993).

2. Gaudium et Spes, in Proclaiming Justice and Peace 99 (Michael Walsh & Brian
Davies, eds. 1984).
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at least since the time of Thomas Aquinas, though it has roots as early
as the apologists of the second century. This tendency affirms the autonomy of reason and of secular intellectual and professional disciplines, but it also affirms an independent role for religious belief and
theology in articulating the human situation and in discerning what
human beings may rightly do. It expresses an aspiration toward the
harmony of nature and grace, of faith and reason, of church and society which has been of enormous practical as well as theoretical importance within Catholicism. At the same time, we should recognize that
such an aspiration to harmony has been regarded by many Protestants
and by some Catholics as an inadequate guide to the struggles of a
sinful humanity to achieve some realization of Christian values in a
world marked by conflict and the libido dominandi, the craving for
power, which Augustine saw as characteristic of the pagan world and
of any society which refused to conform itself to the will and the authority of God.
But, even though I think that there might be a Catholic way of moving to something like Foley's conclusion, I also have to record three
uncertainties which I have about his project. The first of these is
whether Foley, along with Rawls and other proponents of separation
of religion from public reason, has an accurate reading of the actual
dynamics of religious-political conflict in the contemporary United
States. At least in the case of Rawls, I think that in the background of
the argument there is a scenario of how religious disruption of a liberal society works. It goes something like this: a) there is a religious
group ("the Church") which looks for special privileges (perhaps a
quasi-establishment of some sort) for itself and which attempts to
block other groups from having comparable protection or influence
(and so threatens the free exercise of religion by others); b) the religious group has a theological rationale for its activity which is shared
by or imposed on its members, including those who are active participants in the political process but which is not something which can be
shared with other persons who stand outside the religious group and
who have different comprehensive theories about reality, truth, and
goodness; c) the religious group is monolithic or at least has enough
internal discipline and cohesion so that it, its members, and the organizations and institutions which it controls will move along the same
political lines, maneuvering like some vast political convoy through
the waters of Massachusetts Bay or southern Lake Michigan; and d)
the actual or prospective success of the religious group in achieving its
program will stir up opposition among other religious or ideological
groups and will cause civil enmity and destabilization of the society,
perhaps ultimately leading to a renewal of religious warfare, which
most will admit was one of the most grievous afflictions of early modern Europe. Even if this does not happen, there is a fear that those
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who are not members of the aggressive religious group will be reduced
to the status of second class citizens.
I trust that the terms in which I have laid out this scenario, a scenario which I would call "the church threat" (I was tempted to call it
simply "the Catholic threat"), will evoke a certain skepticism about
the likelihood of such a course of events in the late twentieth-century
United States. If we direct our attention to the specific steps in the
scenario, we can see that "b" does not hold for any significant group
apart from Islam, which is not in any position to impose its theology
on the American public; "a" may apply to various religious groups on
its positive side, but no group comes forward explicitly in favor of restricting the religious liberties of others. But the most significant
change in recent times has occurred with regard to "c," especially
within Catholicism, which has clearly developed significant internal
divisions.
Here I am reminded of a remark which the late John Cogley, who
was then associated with Commonweal, made when he was asked
whether the recently concluded Vatican II would leave any lasting divisions within the Catholic church. He said, "Yes - orthodox, conservative, and reform." I am struck and often disedified by the
enthusiasm which members of what is purportedly one religious body
bring to challenging the views and the moral integrity of their co-religionists. This, of course, is not a peculiarly Catholic phenomenon, as
any observer of disputes in the rabbinate or between main-line and
evangelical Protestants can readily attest.
What is particularly helpful here is the account of current American
controversies offered by James Davison Hunter.3 Hunter stresses the
differences within the denominational communities, particularly the
division between orthodox and progressive ways of interpreting the
traditions of these communities. If Hunter is right, then the most
deeply felt and most socially significant differences have ceased to be
those among Catholics, Protestants, and Jews and have now become
the internal divisions within those groups. These divisions are rooted
in differences about accepting or opposing some of the secularizing
tendencies which put pressure on religious groups to conform to the
norms and practices of the larger society. There are also significant
coalitions across denominational lines in support of Israel, for and
against abortion, for and against sex education in the public schools,
for and against unfettered expression in the public media, etc.
Now I am less than convinced that the orthodox/progressive division overrides denominational differences across the board. For instance, it is easy to imagine a conservative Catholic family being more
concerned about a son's marrying a Jewish girl than about his mar3. James Davison Hunter, The Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America
(1991).
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rying a liberal or progressive Catholic. But I think that the orthodox/
progressive division is the one which is most salient in the major political fora, in the demands for legislation, in the protests against court
decisions, in the pressures brought to bear on presidential candidates.
If that is so, then it is reasonable to think that what exacerbates social,
political, and religious tension is not the effort to establish the views
or practices of a particular denomination, but rather a series of judicial and political decisions which have altered what orthodox religious
groups have regarded as the common moral patrimony of our pluralistic society. Encouraging the courts to adopt a purely secular approach
to arguments and decisions really amounts to urging them to come
down on one side of the cultural wars rather than another, in effect, to
take sides in the most inflamed religious disputes of our time. Many
of the values argued about with regard to family life and sexuality,
challenges to traditional authority in all spheres, public education, and
health care decisions are not tied to particular denominations but to
the progressive/orthodox polarity which crosses over denominational
boundaries. Differences between Catholics and Protestants, for instance, on such issues as contraception, abortion, divorce, tolerance of
homosexuality certainly do not arise from the Reformation, but from
the different rates at which the religious groups have moved away
from traditional norms. The Hunter analysis of contemporary conflicts does not show in itself that major Supreme Court decisions have
been mistaken or that Foley's view is wrong; but it does a great deal to
show why the secularizing approach does so little to reduce conflict.
The first uncertainty I have considered was about the shape of religious disagreement that might be thought to threaten the stability of
secular order; the second uncertainty has to do with the level of moral
disagreement which provokes social controversy and political engagement in contemporary American society. Here I propose a map based
on an observation made by the late Alan Donagan.4 He notes that
there is comparatively broad agreement on the precepts of morality,
though not on the resolution of particular cases (in which different
moralists and different traditions often accord different weights to the
considerations whose presence they acknowledge) and not on the ultimate justification of moral precepts. By the precepts of morality,
Donagan means norms of the level of specificity found in the Decalogue, in contrast to more general pronouncements such as the categorical imperative or the principle of utility. These are precepts which
Catholics would include in the content of natural law and which Jews
would regard as binding on the children of Noah who did not share
Israel's covenantal relationship with the Lord. Agreement on such
precepts is necessary for the stability of society and its major institu-

4. Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (1977).
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tions because these precepts touch on the protection of life, the property system, the legal system, and the family.
Now it seems to me that to a very large extent there continues to be
broad agreement on these precepts, but that in contemporary American society we have run into a series of disputes which focus on somewhat more specific principles and which center on categories which
either should or should not be included within the scope of the familiar precepts which prohibit murder, theft, false witness, and adultery.
Thus within the agreement that human life is to be protected and that
murder is wrong, ferocious arguments rage about whether this norm
applies prior to birth. The fact of the disagreement is powerful and
unavoidable; but it derives much of its power and its importance from
its relationship to the more general precept forbidding murder. This is
a consideration which should count against drawing straightforward
relativistic conclusions from the abundant evidence of sustained moral
disagreement in our culture.
Disputes about euthanasia, capital punishment, and the continued
viability of just-war doctrine all fall under the general heading of how
to draw the line between permissible and impermissible forms of killing. They are questions that can be raised within particular moral traditions (utilitarianism, Kantianism, natural law theory, a theonomous
or biblical approach). What is not clear to me is whether achieving
agreement on some ultimate ground of moral justification is either
necessary or sufficient to resolve these ongoing disputes, many of
which seem to be driven by non-theoretical changes which have been
occurring in our society, e.g., the rise of the women's movement,
changes in medical technology and pharmacology and in
demographics, changes which reflect the anonymity of urban life. This
should not strike us as philosophically scandalous. The issue is
whether, given the moral prohibition against taking human life, certain standard types of exceptions to that prohibition should be allowed or disallowed. The reasons for and against such a change are
not reducible simply to previous and more general premises in a moral
theory but reflect the complex and changing experience of people in
contemporary society.
If something like this cursory mapping of the arguments in this area
of moral and legal dispute is correct, then it does not seem that we
need to resolve ultimate jurisprudential issues; this should come as a
welcome relief in a pluralistic society. Rather, as a society we need to
arrive at legal resolutions of these issues which will to the extent possible respect the consciences of ordinary citizens and protect the basic
values recognized by our society and which will thus preserve religious
liberty and social peace.
The third area of uncertainty that I feel as I look over Professor
Foley's paper is conceptual. It is really a double conceptual difficulty.
The first part of it runs something like this. We know what it means
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for a judge to aim at neutrality or impartiality between disputants in a
legal case. For instance, in attempting to resolve a dispute between a
Christian and a Jew, it would be not merely offensive but a serious
failing in impartiality for a judge to base his or her decision on a premise which was affirmed in the religious tradition of one of the parties
to the dispute and denied in the religious tradition of the other. This
seems obvious when, for instance, the judge relies on a Christian
premise and decides the case in favor of the Christian; the more interesting situation, I suggest, is one in which the judge relies on a Christian premise and decides the case against the Christian. In any event,
we have some idea of what we are worried about. The central element in our concern is that the matter is settled in a way which advantages one party in the dispute, which raises doubt as to whether justice
will be seen to be done in the case, and which seems to be a ready
instrument for the entrenchment of prejudice. The law then becomes
an alien imposition which one privileged group uses to coerce the
members of a less privileged group. This revolts our sense of justice
and is a plausible threat to the stability of social order, roughly on the
lines mentioned earlier with regard to "the church threat."
We can extend our understanding of this situation to the similar but
not identical situation in which the court is asked to be impartial or
neutral between religion and irreligion, between belief and unbelief.
Here, of course, we are not talking about a specific sort of religious
belief (Catholic or Shi'ite or Presbyterian or Orthodox Jewish), but
about the whole family of religious beliefs. But we are not talking, as
epistemologists would, about all sorts of beliefs about sealing wax and
cabbages and kings, about likely pennant winners and the paths of
comets; but more specifically about what Foley discusses as transcendental beliefs. We can see that it would be unfair to persons who are
skeptical about all religious beliefs to have their cases decided on
grounds which presuppose the acceptance of one or more commonly
held religious beliefs. So the constitutional rejection of religious tests,
even of the most generic sort, impresses us as an appropriate exercise
of fairness.
But when we move to the next stage, the other half of the difficulty
comes into play. That is, the notion of religion is broadened to include virtually any belief that brings with it what Quine would call an
"ontological commitment." There is precedent for this in the jurisprudence shaping conscientious objection cases, in which beliefs which
held a place comparable to traditional religious beliefs, even if they
involved no commitments with regard to a supernatural creator or a
divine being or were not associated with the teachings of any traditionally recognized religious body, were to be accorded equal status in
justifying and legitimating moral objections to participation in war. I
do not mean to challenge the extension of the status of conscientious
objector to those who lack traditional religious beliefs and commit-
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ments. Rather, my concern is that once one begins to equate religion
and any strong belief about nature or ultimate reality or any belief
which could imply such a strong belief, then both the sense of contrast
between belief and unbelief and the social good to be achieved by
neutrality between them become vague and, I would argue, ultimately
incoherent.
Professor Foley now grants that there are inescapable difficulties in
attempting to maintain a strict meta-ethical or jurisprudential neutrality.5 What he commends us to is a regime in which meta-ethical and
ultimate jurisprudential rationales are kept private and even covert
for the sake of achieving greater acceptability for public judicial opinions. He grants that such a regime in which ultimate justifications are
kept out of public view runs the risk of appearing arbitrary.6 The feasibility of maintaining such a regime in an open society seems highly
questionable. The continuation of such a regime would, in fact, diminish the public credibility of decisions which offered the appearance of
neutrality achieved by the suppression of contentious issues which are
understood to be intrinsic to the process of judicial reasoning
(whereas many theological considerations can be excluded by a careful and appropriate focusing of the question to be decided).
In conclusion, I am struck by a paradox in the argument that Professor Foley offers us in his eloquent and lively paper. On the one hand,
theology and "the religious" become encompassing notions, which do
not require any reference to God; at the same time, this is used as a
justification for removing not merely religion but also its various
equivalents and substitutes from the realm of public discourse and decision. My sense is that this sort of paradox is an expectable result of
a strategy that seeks both for ultimate justification and for consensus
beyond contestability in a pluralistic society. Our living together as
well as we do and as contentiously as our various traditions of prophecy and witness require is a remarkable thing, an effect, one suspects,
of certain graced pragmatism rather than of a drive for theoretical
consistency and perfect neutrality.

5. Edward B. Foley, Jurisprudence and Theology, 66 Fordham L Rev. 1195,
1206-7 (1998).
6. Mdat 1209.
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